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Abstract 
The panel structure of the Survey on Smoking in Canada (1994-5) and 
novel methods are used to estimate the impact of an important decrease 
in the levels of taxation of cigarettes occurring in five out of the ten 
Canadian provinces that intended to eradicate black market sales of 
cigarettes in the spring of 1994. Given that black market sales have 
recently increased substantially because of new taxes, a complete and 
thorough analysis of the 1994 policy is of particular importance for 
policy makers. We revisit the issue with new econometric methods to 
address this evaluation problem as well as focus on particular sub-
groups in the Canadian population. The large sample permits precise 
estimation of the impact of the policy by sub-group showing that 
females, young males, the poorly educated, and separated or divorced 
individuals were particularly sensitive to these dramatic changes in 
cigarette prices.  We also compute under realistic assumptions a price-
elasticity for the probability of smoking and a lower bound on the price-
elasticity for the quantities of cigarettes smoked. 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Thanks are due to B. Fortin, Laval University, for precious information on the tax cut and its 
consequences. We take full responsibility for the errors in this paper. 
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Introduction 
 
In the spring of 1994, in order to eliminate the sales of contraband cigarettes, the 
governments of 5 Canadian provinces dramatically reduced taxes on cigarettes, lowering the 
overall price of cigarettes to the level of black market prices.  This policy basically eradicated the 
black market in these areas. Since then, taxes have been increased to their former levels causing 
the black market to flourish again. In 2005 and 2006, a survey of smokers in Ontario (Luk, 
Cohen, and Ferrence 2007) estimated that: 37% of current smokers in Ontario report ever 
purchasing cigarettes on native reserves, 26% of current smokers report having bought at least 
one pack of cigarettes on reserves in the previous six months, 12% of current smokers report 
usually purchasing cigarettes on reserves. 
Should the governments adopt the same strategy as in 1994? If they do, it is feasible that this 
will cause an increase in cigarette consumption and health costs associated with smoking. To add 
some new light on this important policy issue, we revisit a paper by Hamilton et al (1997) that 
used a difference in differences method to evaluate the impact of the tax decrease on the 
prevalence of smoking in the provinces where the policy was implemented. A recent study 
concludes that the tax change had no impact on tobacco use in the provinces where the tax change 
occurred (Ouellet 2010). This paper is used by convenience store owners in their lobbying 
attempts to reduce cigarette taxes as in 1994 ( http://www.acda-aqda.ca/, web site of the retailer 
association).  Their own estimates suggest that 50% of cigarettes in 2010 are bought in the black 
market.   
We redo the analysis using new methods proposed by Athey and Inbens (2006) as well as 
Blundell and Costas-Diaz (2009) and with a larger sample. We find some interesting results 
showing that the policy had very strong positive effects on the proportion of individuals smoking 
for particular sub-groups.. We also adjust standard errors for the panel structure in the data. We 
find much larger effects when we adjust the policy effects for the percentage of individuals who 
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did not experience a price change as a large proportion of individuals were already buying 
cigarettes at very low prices. Finally, we use our estimates to derive direct price elasticities which 
are, for tobacco and alcohol expenditures, generally difficult to estimate using aggregate time-
series of prices and quantities because of the collinearity between the price of cigarettes and 
various trends influencing household expenditures. Furthermore, long-term effects of changes in 
price may differ from short-term effects: first, because of habit or addiction, second, because of 
the nature of price variations (permanent or transitory, expected or unexpected).  We use in this 
paper a panel data set that spans 18 months, the Survey on Smoking in Canada (1994-5) publicly 
available from Statistics Canada, in order to estimate the changes in smoking habits caused by the 
dramatic decrease in prices due to the decrease of taxes on tobacco goods that occurred in 5 out of 
the 10 Canadian provinces. From our results, we compute reliable estimates of the price-elasticity 
of the prevalence of smoking and lower bounds for the price-elasticity of the quantity of 
cigarettes smoked.  
The estimation of price-elasticities of smoking behaviour using the natural experiment of 
1994, the availability of panel data, and  difference in differences methodologies have several 
advantages over studies that use regression analysis to estimate the price-elasticity of smoking 
behavior. First, no instruments are necessary to estimate the price effects of smoking behavior. 
The price reduction was exogenous and rapidly executed.  Second, the variation in confounding 
explanatory variables such as income will certainly be very small and produce little bias for the 
estimates as the data covers only 18 months. Third, because the data is longitudinal, fixed 
individual effects are controlled for by the analysis. Our view is that this experiment and a 
difference in differences methods will produce more credible estimates of price-elasticities than 
IV methods based on aggregate provincial data or studies with individual data that do not take 
into account the endogeneity of price changes in the long-run.    
 Generally speaking, direct price elasticities for supposed addictive goods have been found 
to be very small or null in early studies (see Kopp, 2004, p. 45): indeed, Chaloupka’s (1991, 
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p.735) estimates range between – 0.07 and – 0.01 for a non-addictive demand equation estimated 
with a panel of American individuals. Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) challenged this 
result considering that habits and addiction provoke on the contrary substantial price effects in the 
long term, because small permanent price variations impart changes in the stock of consumption, 
which have long term effects on future expenditures.  Mullahy (1985) (cited in Becker et al.) 
showed that the estimates of the direct price elasticity for cigarettes are, for various studies, 
distributed between -0.4 and -0.5. Becker et al. using macro time series or repeated cross-sections 
of state level data in the United States, produced estimates for permanent changes in prices of 
around -.4 for the short-term, and -.7 to -.8 for the long term, rather large values compared to 
other commodities. Furthermore, temporary price changes also impart important effects on 
cigarette consumption (elasticity of -.35, Becker et al., Table 5.4). Chaloupka’s (1991) estimates 
are between -.36 and -.27 for the whole population, and even between -.35 and -.48 for current or 
former smokers. Cook-Tauchen (1982) (cited in Becker et al.) considers that alcohol consumption 
is even more price elastic (with elasticities between –1.8 and –1).  Price effects are also shown to 
be important for other addictive products, such as heroin or opium (Kopp, p. 46-47).   
 Recently, in France, taxes on tobacco increased three times between January 2003 and 
January 2004: first by 11% in January 2003, then by 20% in September and 9% in January 2004. 
Before this last increase, consumption had already declined by 16%, which corresponds to a 
direct price elasticity of -.48 for these two years, a figure similar to those obtained in estimations 
of addiction models with American data. But this elasticity corresponds to short run effects, and 
moreover is strongly biased by the unknown, but very important, increase of informal markets2 
and aggregate trends. 
 A meta-analysis of the elasticities of cigarette demand (Gallet and List 2003) 
finds a mean elasticity of -0.48 and a standard deviation of 0.43 computed with the results from 
                                                 
2
 Also, the price increases have been accompagnied by various changes of the French legislation on drug 
use, such as public avertising on the medical consequences of smoking. 
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86 studies, they find also that elasticities from more recent studies are in the low range as well as 
those in the major journals.  
Some recent evidence in the United States by Franks et al (2007) suggests that the price 
elasticity of cigarettes is now very low for all income groups (estimated with a sample period of 
1997 to 2004,  the post tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, MSA, years) while it was 
particularly high for low-income individuals using a sample covering 1984 to 1996. They propose 
that tobacco tax increases not be undertaken because their main effect would be to increase 
income inequalities with smoking behavior unchanged. A rebuttal by Farrelly and Engelen 
(2008), who include the years 2005 and 2006 in a similar analysis, shows a statistically 
significant effect of price changes only for low-income individuals with the MSA sample period 
with a low price-elasticity of -.11.    
 There are also recent studies with Canadian data.  Zhang et al. (2002) find a very large 
price elasticity of -3.36 of smoking initiation for young adults who are 20 to 24 years of age using 
longitudinal data at the individual level in the National Population Health Survey for Cycles 1 
(1994-1995) and 2 (1996-1997) and provincial price variation. Using the same data, but with a 
sample of 14 to 19 year-olds, Dupont and Ward (2002) find an elasticity for the probability of 
smoking of -0.914.  Finally, Gruber, Sen, and Stabile (2003) compute elasticities for cigarette 
demand with two data sets. The first contains aggregate provincial level data on cigarette sales, 
the second uses household level data on annual cigarette expenditures. The find demand 
elasticities in the range of -.45 and -.47. The authors use several years of data as well as IV 
methods for estimation.   
 All these studies prove that the estimated price elasticities depend highly on the 
specification, static or dynamic, of the demand for cigarettes and on the nature of the datasets: 
indeed, the effect of price increases on persistent smokers are not disentangled, in these studies, 
from those which depend on the decision to start or stop smoking. Second, price effects seem to 
depend on the socio-economic characteristics of individuals. They differ for instance between 
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low-income agents or the young and the rest of the population. A systematic analysis is thus 
needed distinguishing these sub-populations, which cannot be accomplished with usual 
econometric estimation of demand system, using aggregate or semi-aggregate data.  
Section 1 presents previous findings using the Survey on Smoking in Canada (1994-5), 
Section 2 presents methods of estimation and estimates of the price effects due to the tax change, 
Section 3 constructs estimates of the price elasticities and a final section offers a summary and 
conclusions. 
 
Section 1. Previous findings using the 1994-95 Canadian panel on smoking habits 
 
In Canada, as mentioned earlier, the federal government as well as 5 provincial 
governments3 dramatically decreased tax rates on cigarettes sales in the spring of 1994. Gilmore 
(2000, p.3) notes that between two surveys made in 1994-95 and 1996-97, 10% of the smokers 
quit, among those, 6% started to smoke again, and 2% began smoking. This was very different 
from earlier figures: for instance, between 1985 and 1991, the smoking population decreased by 
4.3% (from 35.1 to 30.8%), and did not change between 1991 and 1994-95 (a period during 
which the black market developed rapidly), while this population decreased once again by 5.8% 
between 1994-95 and 1999. Various macroeconomic and institutional changes also occurred 
during these periods, so that an estimation strategy must be defined in order to take into account 
all the determinants of smoking behavior.  
The 1994 Canadian National Survey on Smoking was produced in order to evaluate the 
consequences of the important federal and provincial tax decrease in 5 provinces on cigarettes 
consumption. Approximately 15,000 individuals were surveyed in the spring of 1994 and asked 
to take part in a longitudinal survey. By the end of the survey, 12,338 individuals were involved 
in the panel. The survey concerned essentially cigarette consumption, particularly among the 
                                                 
3
 A federal tax is the same for all provinces, while province taxes may differ. 
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young, who were over-represented in the sample. Its objectives were: (1) the measurement of the 
number of smokers and the volume of consumption, (2) the estimation of the effects of the price 
change, especially for the young, (3) collecting information on attitudes towards cigarette 
smoking and more generally tobacco consumption.  
The survey is fully described in Gardes, Ghabri, Merrigan (2000) and Statistics Canada, 
1995. It contains individual characteristics such as age, sex, education, marital status, but also 
questions on the existence of other smokers in the family, on the household structure and its 
income class. Also, people were asked whether they had smoked at least 100 cigarettes during 
their life, or at least one. The panel structure and the information on the quantities of cigarettes 
are important features of this data set, individual specific effects (psychological and 
physiological) certainly play a crucial role determining cigarette consumption.  
Gardes, Ghabri, Merrigan (2000) present some descriptive findings using the survey and 
simple linear regression methods. The probability to smoke as well as the quantity of cigarettes 
varies with age in an inverse U shape: the proportion of smokers is higher for individuals aged 25 
to 34 (40%), and declines to 15% for individuals older than 70 (see additional evidence in Table 
4, in this paper, by region where tax cuts occurred). The average quantity of cigarettes smoked for 
smokers increases continuously until 55-64 for men (45-54 for women), an evolution which 
would be considered, until this age, as clearly relevant for addiction effects by this theory (note 
also that the inverse U of quantities is more accentuated for men, which may indicate lower 
addictive effects compared to women). Both the proportion of smokers and the quantities smoked 
are higher for men (see Table 3 in this paper). Educated people smoke 5 cigarettes less on average 
and in a smaller proportion than the uneducated (Table 7). The presence of young children 
decreases consumption, but only for lone parents. Income effects are not significant (perhaps 
because of their collinearity with age in the regressions, and also because income is measured 
with only 7 classes). Some social interaction effects are suggested by large impacts of other 
smokers in the family on the probability of smoking, and by the higher proportion of smokers in 
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some provinces (Québec, British Columbia). Separated or divorced individuals compose the 
demographic group with the largest proportion of smokers (Table 6).  
Using the same survey on tobacco use in Canada covering the period of January 1994 to 
the spring of 1995, Hamilton et al. (1997) presents convincing evidence (details in Section 3) that 
the reduction in taxes has a positive effect on the prevalence of smoking in the provinces where 
tax cuts were undertaken in the spring of 1994 but do not perform extensive sub-group analysis 
nor do they construct price elasticities of smoking behavior.  
 
Section 2. Estimation of the price effects due to the tax change 
 
2.1. Difference in differences, three methods.  
With panel data, the well-known difference in differences estimator (DID) of the policy 
effect is estimated as 
                          =(                            , 
 
 
P is for proportion of smokers, the superscripts refer to the “treatment” groups (tax or no tax 
decrease), 1 for “treatment”, 0 for “controls”, the indices refer to the time period, 1 for May 1995, 
and 0 for January 1994, n10 is the number of smokers at baseline that stopped smoking in period 
2, n01 is the number of non-smokers at baseline that start to smoke in period 2. Finally, ni , i=0,1, 
is the total number of individuals in the sample.  
The variance of the DID estimator is computed as (given the panel nature of the data): 
                                  
with 
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                                     2                   .  
P11 is the proportion of smokers who remain smokers between periods 1 and 0, P00 is the 
proportion remaining non-smokers between periods 1 and 0, P10 is the proportion switching from 
smoker to non-smoker, while P01 is the opposite.  
We present two other estimators. The difference in differences estimator does not take 
into consideration that the dependent variable is binary and that the probabilities must be between 
0 and 1. Athey and Imbens (2006) and Blundell and Costas-Diaz (2009) propose alternative 
estimators which are consistent with constraints on probabilities. Athey and Imbens also propose 
bounds for the policy effect (assuming only that unobservable variables that determine smoking 
are weakly monotonic, but with no conditional independence assumptions), that we also compute 
with our sample. The Athey and Imbens point-estimator (AI) is given by 
 
                    
This estimator is based on the assumption that unobserved variables that determine the choice of 
smoking is independent of group effects (in this case the group is defined by the region where the 
tax cut occurred), conditional on the outcome (smoking) and the treatment (the tax cut). This 
formula is used because the change in the prevalence of smokers in the no tax cut region is 
negative between the two periods; a different formula is used if this change had been positive. In 
the words of AI: “When the time trend in the control group is negative, the counterfactual is the 
probability of successes in the treatment group initial period, adjusted by the proportional change 
over time in the probability of success in the control group.” The standard error of the estimate is 
computed with the Delta method. We refer the readers to the Imbens and Athey for the procedure 
that computes the bounds of the policy effect.  
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Finally, we present the Blundell and Costas-Diaz estimator (BCD) by assuming a probit 
model with  the normal distribution function and obtain, the treatment effect,                         , 
where                                            . 
 
Therefore, the counterfactual in the treatment group in the post-policy period is 
constructed by subtracting from the observed index in the cumulative in the post-policy period, 
the difference in differences estimate of the treatment effect on the index function and 
substituting this result in the cumulative. 
  
2.2  Data and Empirical Results  
 
A number of 15,804 individuals responded in the first wave of the 1994 Canadian 
National Survey on Smoking in May 1994, they were then re-contacted 3 other times, from Aug. 
16 to Sep. 16, 1994, Nov 14. to Dec. 16, 1994, and finally from Feb. 15 to Mar. 16, 1995. In the 
first wave, respondents were asked whether or not they were smokers on January 1 1994 and if 
they currently smoked. Hamilton et al. use the January 1 answer as a baseline from which to 
observe the evolution of smoking prevalence in the Canadian population. We shall also adopt the 
January 1 answer as baseline. They restrict their analysis to respondents that answer questions on 
smoking habits for all 4 waves of the survey. Attrition in the sample reduces the number of 
individuals used in the sample to 11,119 individuals.  
Their main finding is that in all provinces the percentage of smokers considerably 
diminished with a more important drop in provinces with no tax cuts. Using a difference in 
difference methodology, they estimate that the tax cuts increased smoking by 1.4 percentage 
points (p < .001). In provinces without tax cuts, prevalence decreased by 3.4 percentage points 
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while it decreased by 2 percentage points in provinces with tax cuts. The authors suggest that the 
analysis be extended to different demographic sub-groups: the goal of the next sub-section. 
We choose a different sample than Hamilton et al in order to increase the number of 
observations. We sample individuals that respond in both waves 1 and 4, adding 1,219 
individuals in the study. Given that individual smokers respond slowly to price changes it is 
logical to concentrate on differences in smoking between the first and last wave of the survey.  
Therefore, our sample is based on 12,338 individuals (78 % of the original sample) that 
answer to questions in the spring of 1994 and the spring of 1995. Using the same methodology as 
Hamilton et al., we compute the prevalence of smoking for both periods in provinces with tax 
cuts and compute the difference in prevalence change between the two periods. Our results are 
substantially different from that of Hamilton et al. with the larger sample. We also obtain 
different p values for our tests because we consider the fact that the observations are dependent 
because of the panel nature of the data.  
Using the DID estimator, we estimate the policy effect with the Hamilton sample, 
obtaining the same point estimates, and find that the p-value is larger and the z statistic is much 
lower than in their paper (Table 1). Table 2 presents the results from our sample. Because of the 
substantial over sampling for certain demographic groups, all results are computed using weights 
provided by Statistics Canada.  
 
Table 1 
Proportions of smokers in each region before and after the tax cut and impact of the tax 
change on the proportion of smokers (Hamilton sample) 
N P1 P2 Impact z p 
Tax cut 
Yes 5930 0.308 0.283 0.0145 2.81 0.005 
No 5189 0.289 0.249 
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 Table 2 
Proportions of smokers in each region before and after the tax cut and impact of the tax 
change on the proportion of smokers (our sample) 
 
Tax cut  N P 1      P 0
                      
  Yes  6545 0.315 0.285
  No      5793 0.287 0.251
AI impact BCD impact
0.0099 2.04** 0.0130 2.72* 0.0114
AI Bounds Lower Upper
-0.026 0.315
DID impact           z        
 
  
Note: *significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level. 
 
The impact with the DID estimator computed with the larger sample in Table 2 is .4 of a 
percentage point lower than in Hamilton et al., a 28 percent difference, with a substantially lower 
p value, but remaining statistically significant. The AI estimator is closer to the original estimate 
of Hamilton et al. The BCD estimate lies between the latter estimates. The AI bounds are not very 
informative but do point towards a positive effect of the policy. This statement applies to all cases 
analyzed afterwards in the paper.   
 The first demographic subgroups analyzed were male and female respondents. Table 3 
presents the results for males and females separately. The DID estimator finds no difference 
between the reaction of males and females to the tax cut, as its impact is almost exactly the same. 
However the AI estimate is much larger for females and is statistically significant. This is a very 
important policy result considering the lobby for the reduction of tobacco taxes. Again the BCD 
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estimate lies between the first two estimates.  Turning to different age groups, interesting results 
are apparent in Table 4. 
 
Table 3 
Proportions of smokers in each region before and after the tax cut and impact of the tax 
change on the proportion of smokers (male and female) 
 
Tax cut        SEX   N      
   P 1       P 0        
 yes   Male 2961 0.317 0.297
 yes Female 3584 0.306 0.274
 no      Male 2666 0.320 0.290
 no      Female 3127 0.255 0.213
 
Sex DID Impact z AI impact z BCD impact
   Male  0.009797 1.412 0.0095 1.436 0.0097
   Female 0.010108 1.525 0.0186 2.675* 0.0145
AI Bounds Lower Upper
   Male  -0,020 0.317
   Female -0.033 0.306
 
Note:* significant at the 1% level. 
Table 4 
Proportions of smokers in each region before and after the tax cut and impact of the tax 
change on the proportion of smokers (age groups) 
 
Tax cut  Age           N             P1 P0     
Yes     
 15-19   1371 0.294 0.267 
 20-24 1072 0.405 0.346 
 25-34 877 0.357 0.325 
 35-44  762 0.361 0.343 
 45-54 362 0.305 0.280 
           55-64 379 0.264 0.240 
          65-69 644 0.228 0.202 
    70+         1078 0.128 0.119 
No                15-19 1167 0.289 0.241 
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      20-24 854 0.371 0.325 
         25-34 776 0.349 0.331 
      35-44 675 0.241 0.222 
       45-54 407 0.364 0.295 
         55-64 380 0.253 0.187 
   65-69  538 0.179 0.140 
 70+  996 0.139 0.127 
 
     
Age DID Impact z AI Impact z BCD Impact
15-19 0.021 1.44 0.022 1.60 0.215
20-24 -0.013 0.80 -0.010 -0.55 0.012
25-34 -0.014 -0.99 -0.130 -0.97 0.013
35-44 0.002 0.15 0.011 0.79 0.006
45-54 0.044 2,33** 0.033 2,04** 0.038
55-64 0.043 2,46** 0.046 2,76* 0.047
65-69 0.012 1.04 0.023 1.84 0.019
70+      0.004 0.50 0.001 0.39 0.003
Age AI lower bound AI upper bound
15-19 -0.027 0.294
20-24 -0.06 0.405
25-34 -0.031 0.357
35-44 -0.017 0.36
45-54 -0.026 0.305
55-64 -0.023 0.267
65-69 -0.026 0.228
70+      -0.009 0.128
 
Note: :* significant at the 1% level.; ** significant at the 5% level. 
 
The results are similar by method except for the 45-54 age group where the AI estimate is 
considerably smaller than the DID estimate and the 65-69 age group where the AI estimate is 
larger and significant at the 10% level. We find that the impact is large for 3 groups, the very 
young and the middle aged. The fact that the young are affected is worrisome given that almost 
all individuals report having smoked their first cigarette before 20 years of age. To pursue this 
result, we measured the impact of the tax cut on the young by sex.  We will provide an 
explanation of the impacts for the middle aged group later with results from other sub-samples. 
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The results for young individuals by sex are found in Table 5. They show that young males, 
results being very similar for all three methods, were extremely sensitive to the tax cut whatever 
the method used for estimation.  
 
Table 5 
Proportions of smokers in each region before and after the tax cut and impact of the tax 
change on the proportion of smokers (male and female, 15-19) 
    
Sex Tax cut   N      P 1 P 0
M Yes 684 0.271 0.264
F Yes 687 0.317 0.270
  
M No 599 0.283 0.228
F No 568 0.295 0.254
SEX DID Impact z AI Impact z BCD Impact
  M 0.0479 2.26** 0.0479 2.40** 0.0466
  F -0.007 -0.35 -0.0039 -0.2
 
 
AI Bounds Lower Upper
   Male  -0.007 0.271
   Female -0.047 0.317
 
 
Note: ** significant at the 5% level. 
 
  Table 6 presents the results of the tax cuts for the separated or divorced, who are mostly 
middle aged individuals. As for young males, whichever the method used, separated or divorced 
individuals are very sensitive to the tax cuts. 
 The last groups we will analyze are based on education levels as individuals who are 
poorly educated are more probable smokers. Individuals were separated in 4 groups, (1) no high 
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school diploma, (2) completed secondary, (3) completed community college, (4) completed 
university. The results are in Table 7.  Only for the lower education group did we find a 
significant effect, for the other three the effects are very small and far from significant. 
 
Table 6 
Proportions of smokers in each region before and after the tax cut and impact of the tax 
change on the proportion of smokers (separated or divorced) 
 
Tax cut N P1 P0 
 Yes 430 0.449 0.434 
 No 362 0.449 0.391 
 
     DID Impact     Z AI Impact    Z BCD Impact 
0.044 2.17** 0.044 2.27**      0.044 
 
Note: **significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table 7 
Proportions of smokers in each region before and after the tax cut and impact of the tax 
change on the proportion of smokers with a low level of education 
 
Tax cut       N
  P 1       P 0
Yes       2268 0.319 0.300
No 1978 0.307 0.255
            
DID Impact      z AI Impact z BCD Impact
0.0336 4.10* 0.0356 4.52* 0.0346
 
AI bounds lower upper
-0,019 0,319
 
 
Note: *significant at the 1% level. Because the education level is asked in wave 2, the total number of 
available observations is less than 12,338 for the analysis as the number of respondents dropped from 
15,408 in wave 1 to 13,150 in wave 2. Since we keep respondents that answer in wave 1 and wave 4, we 
end up with 11402 for the analysis based on education level. 
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We obtain a strong positive and statistically significant effect for the individuals in the 
group with the lowest level of education who are from lower income households so that the 
increase in disposable income after the tax cut is the highest in percentage terms for this group. 
They are also in a group where smoking is less frowned upon. Also, middle aged groups are 
cohorts with a larger proportion of less educated individuals. Therefore, since middle aged 
individuals have many separated or divorced individuals and that they are less educated than the 
younger cohorts plus the fact that they started to smoke in a period where the dangers of smoking 
were less known explain why the impact of prices for this group could be larger.  Results are very 
similar across methods. 
Of course, the attribution of the changes in smoking to the differential in taxes across 
regions is correct if differential in smoking trends were not present before the price changes. As 
mentioned in Hamilton et al, there is no evidence of a stronger negative trend in smoking in the 
no tax cut areas before the price changes. Second, there must not be any regional specific factor 
other than the price change after the price affecting smoking for the estimates to be valid. This 
assumption is plausible given that our panel, spanning only 18 months, is relatively short, so that 
other major factors affecting smoking could not be regional specific without being observed. 
 We now compute for these three groups with strong impacts, the percentage who quit, 
and who continue smoking.  Table 8 presents the results for all three groups.  In all three cases, 
the main channel of the price effect is the differences in quit rates which is very similar for the 
three groups: for young males, the quit rate (start rate) is 2.89 (1.89) percentage points lower 
(higher) in the tax cut region, for separated or divorced, 3.2 (1.16) points lower (higher), and for 
the low education group, it is 3.19 (.18) lower (higher). The largest effect of starts is for young 
males. This is not surprising as most individuals start smoking before they are 20 years of age. 
Hence, the main channel for the positive effect of the tax cuts is its effect on quit rates. The policy 
discouraged individuals from quitting.   
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3. Own-price elasticities of the prevalence of smoking and of cigarettes smoked 
 
 Our results provide evidence that the decrease in prices had an important effect on 
smoking behavior in particular for specific demographic sub-groups and a small positive 
aggregate effect on the prevalence of smokers. These effects hide much larger effects if we 
assume that the price change was not effective for the whole population. Note that the opportunity 
to buy cheap cigarettes in the informal economy was not equally shared by all potential 
consumers, but it certainly concerned an increasing number of households. So the effect of the 
price decrease, first by smuggling opportunities, then by a change of the official price, is perhaps 
under-estimated. We try in this section to take into account the change in the proportions of 
smokers, the resulting changes in the total quantities of cigarettes, in the first quarter and later, 
and the pervasiveness of the black market in order to compute approximate price elasticities for 
the proportion who smoked and the quantities smoked.   
The mean percentage decrease in the price of cigarettes depends on the accessibility of 
black market cigarettes. In Quebec, for example, before February 9 1994, date of the tax cut, the 
price of a carton was 47 $ after tax. After the tax cut, the price dropped to 22.73 $. We postulate 
that the average price decrease on a carton was 47 minus 22.73, 24.27 dollars, a decrease 51.64%. 
The post-tax-change price is probably quite close to the black market price as the latter collapsed 
in a few months. However, according to some researchers who sampled cigarette smokers in 
Quebec, the price drop concerned in fact only 60% of the population (Fortin 2002). We will use 
the numbers from Quebec to compute the elasticities of the proportion of smokers as the price 
changes in other provinces were quite similar. Assuming that 50% (because the survey in Fortin 
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2002 probably underreports the proportion with access to black market cigarettes) of the 
population has access to black market cigarettes, we compute, first, the elasticities of the 
proportion of smokers with respect to the price change, computed at the proportion who smoked 
after the price change. For young males, there is a change .048, since the proportion who smoke 
in the spring of 1995 is .264, our estimated proportion smoking without the price change is .216. 
Hence the increase in percentage is 18 points. Since we assume that only 50 percent experienced 
a price change, the effect is of the order of 36.2%. Since the price decrease was 51.64 percent, we 
obtain an elasticity of .70 which is considerably high. Using the same logic, for low-education 
individuals, the elasticity is .44, while it is .40 for separated or divorced individuals. The 
magnitude of the effects is large, given our reasonable assumptions, and should be of concern for 
policy makers 
 
Table 8 
The percentage of individuals who quit and start smoking for groups with a large impact of 
the tax cuts 
 
Young Males
Tax cut Yes Percent Tax cut No Percent
Quit 7.34 Quit 10.23
Start 6.63 Start 4.74
Separated or divorced
tax cut Yes Percent Tax cut No Percent
Quit 4.25 Quit 7.45
Start 2.78 Start 1.62
Low level of education
Tax cut Yes Percent Tax cut No Percent
Quit 3.76 Quit 6.95
Start 1.88 Start 1.70
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In order to estimate the price elasticity of the quantities of cigarettes smoked, since we do 
not observe the quantity smoked before the price change, but only whether individuals smoked or 
not, we make two assumptions which produce a lower bound for the estimate: 
A1: Individuals who smoke in January 1994 and in the spring of 1995 smoke on average 
the same number of cigarettes, therefore we assume the price change does not change quantities 
smoked by these individuals. 
A2: Individuals who quit smoking, smoked on average the same amount in January as in 
the first month of the survey. 
Given that we compute the quit rates, the start rates, the mean number of cigarettes 
smoked in the last wave of the survey for those who started to smoke and the mean number of 
cigarettes smoked by those who quit smoking before they quit, we can compute the mean increase 
in cigarettes smoked for both tax regions. Given the mean number of cigarettes smoked in wave 1 
of the survey, we can compute the price elasticity of cigarettes smoked.   
 
Table 9 
Impact of the tax change on the quantities of cigarettes smoked 
  
Tax 
cut 
Mean 
cigarettes Quit 
Mean 
cigarettes Start 
Change in 
quantities Impact 
   
Quitters Rate Starters rate smoked 
 
         
         Young males  Yes 11.56 0.073 7.01 0.066 -0.384 0.134 
  
No 7.47 0.102 5.20 0.047 -0.518 
 Separated or Yes 12.73 0.043 7.16 0.028 -0.342 0.280 
Divorced 
 
No 10.56 0.075 10.16 0.016 -0.622 
 Low  
 
Yes 14.87 0.038 
 
0.019 -0.559 0.231 
Education 
 
No 11.37 0.070 
 
0.017 -0.790 
 
 
Note: we do not observe mean quantities smoked for new smokers in the low education group as too few 
start smoking in this group, however, this does not make much of a difference as the start rates are 
practically the same in both regions  
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Assuming that 50% of individuals have access to the black market, the estimated impacts of the 
price change on quantities smoked are .268 for young males, .560 for the separated or divorced, 
and .462 for the low educated group. The means for the number of cigarettes smoked for these 
three groups in the region where tax cuts were effective are respectively, 3.11, 8.29, and 5.59. 
The elasticities are thus, -.167, -.130 and -.160. Therefore, the unconditional elasticities for the 
quantities smoked are much smaller than for the probability smoked. Of course, these are lower 
bounds because the total price elasticities contain also the changes in the quantities smoked by 
persistent smokers, which we cannot estimate using this survey.   
Conclusion 
 The important price change experienced by Canada in 1994 makes possible the 
estimation of direct price elasticities of the quantities of cigarettes smoked in terms of the net 
entries of new smokers as well as the price elasticity of the proportion who smoke. The results for 
quantities seem robust and confirm early estimates using individual data, between -.2 and -.4. For 
the proportion who smoke, price elasticities range from -.4 to -.7. The main effect of the price 
decrease seems to be the discouragement of individuals from quitting, rather than an effect on 
new smokers. Detailed estimates for sub-populations show stronger price effects for the young, 
separated individuals and less educated persons. These elasticities add to the effect of the price 
decrease on the quantities smoked by persistent smokers (note also that the price decrease may 
result in an increase in the quality of cigarettes as well as increased quantities). These results 
should be of concern to policy makers as they are lobbied into reducing once more the price of 
cigarettes4. The effect seems to be larger for women than for men, which can indicate stronger 
addictive behavior, or the fact that less women being smokers, the marginal smokers reacts more 
to price reductions.  Effects on young males are particularly distressing as addiction to smoking 
                                                 
4
 Note that gradual changes may have different consequences than large unique price changes. This can 
only be analyzed for different types of individuals with a long panel. 
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starts at a young age. Secondly, the uneducated group is certainly at risk, without smoking, of 
developing health problems (poor eating habits, obsesity), therefore addition of more risks to this 
group can be very costly to society. The same can be said of separated or divorced individuals 
because they are in low-income households and at risk of developing health problems. 
Furthermore, assuming that 50% of individuals had access to the black market, the treatment on 
the treated effect (effect on those who actually experience the price change) is double the size of 
the estimated effects on the whole population.  
 The evidence in this paper, confirming the results in Hamilton et al. using more modern 
methods, should be of great concern to policy makers who are tempted to repeat the exercise of 
1994. If the trade-off to eradicate the black market is increasing the proportion of young males 
smoking by 5 percentage points and starting a whole new generation of new smokers, the price 
seems very high to pay.   
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